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Foreign direct investment and export under imperfectly competitive host-
country input market 
 
1 Introduction 
Empirical evidences show that multinationals account for a significant portion of 
international trade.
1 However, they often face the important choice of export vs. 
foreign direct investment (FDI), which has generated enormous amount of empirical 
and theoretical literature. 
Empirical evidences suggest that FDI and export can be either substitutes or 
complements.
2 For a representative sample, one may look at Lipsey and Weiss 
(1984), Yamawaki (1991), Brainard (1997), Swenson (1999), Clausing (2000), Head 
and Ries (2001) and Blonigen (2001). While the possibility of substitutability 
between FDI and export has attracted sufficiently large amount of theoretical 
attention, the theoretical literature has paid little attention to explain complementarity 
between FDI and exports. 
  In an earlier contribution Caves (1971) has emphasized scale economies and 
cost factors in determining the choice between FDI and export. More recently, Casson 
(1981), Smith (1987), Horstmann and Markusen (1987a, b, 1996), Mukherjee and 
Broll (2001) and many others have extended this literature. However, all these papers 
have focused on the trade-off between the costs of doing FDI and economizing on the 
costs of export. Thus, these papers show that FDI and export behave like substitutes. 
  In contrary to the above-mentioned papers, this paper provides a rationale for 
doing both export and FDI at the same time and therefore, explains that these two 
options may act as complements. More specifically, we show that a foreign firm may 
do both FDI and export when the input market in the host-country is imperfectly 
competitive and the inputs are non-tradable.  
We consider the production decision of a monopolist foreign firm in the next 
section. We find that if the host-country market is not sufficiently small, it is optimal 
for the foreign firm to do both export and FDI. But, if the market size of the host-
                                                           
1 For example, using the data from 1999, Caves et al. (2002) has demonstrated that over 60% of 
multinational trade can be traced to a small set of developed countries and that 70% of their foreign 
direct investment is hosted by industrial countries. 
2 By substitutes or complements, we mean whether high level of exports is associated 
(contemporaneously) with a high or low level of FDI respectively (see, Rob, and Vettas, 2003).  
  1country is sufficiently small, the foreign firm does only FDI. Export by the foreign 
firm reduces its production under FDI and creates lower demand for input in the host-
country. Thus, export by the foreign firm helps to reduce the price of the inputs in the 
host-country. So, even if export implies higher cost of production, it increases profit 
from FDI by reducing input price in the host-country.  However, if the host-country 
market is sufficiently small, this benefit from lower input price in the host-country is 
not enough to outweigh the negative impact of higher cost of production under export. 
Hence, the foreign firm does FDI when the host-country market is sufficiently small. 
If the host-country market is sufficiently large, the effect of lower input price in the 
host-country market dominates the effect of higher cost of production under export 
and induces the foreign firm to do both export and FDI.  
Section 3 extends the basic model of section 2 to show the impact of 
competition in the final goods market. We consider a potential host-country firm who 
can compete with the foreign firm in the final goods market like Cournot duopolists. 
We find that the foreign firm does ‘FDI only’ and ‘export only’ if the host-country 
market is sufficiently small and sufficiently large respectively. But, it does both 
export and FDI for moderate host-country market size. Hence, competition in the final 
goods market increases the foreign firm’s incentive for doing’ FDI only’ and reduces 
its incentive for doing both FDI and export.  
Presence of the host-country firm reduces the foreign firm’s power to 
manipulate input price in the host-country through its choice of export. If the host-
country market is sufficiently large, sufficiently large demand for inputs by the host-
country firm creates sufficiently high input price in the host-country and makes FDI 
unattractive to the foreign firm. Hence, in this situation, the foreign firm does export 
only. If the host-country market is very small the effect of export on host-country 
input price is not sufficiently large and makes ‘FDI only’ as the optimal decision of 
the foreign firm. But, for moderate market size, the effect of export on the host-
country input price dominates the negative impact of higher cost of production under 
export and provides the rationale for doing both FDI and export.   
  The present paper complements the recent works of Kogut and Kulatilaka 
(1994), Choi and Davidson (2003) and Rob and Vettas (2003), where it has been 
shown that FDI and export are complements when there is uncertainty about cost of 
production or market demand. Kogut and Kulatilaka (1994) show that if the foreign 
  2firms face cost uncertainty, setting up a production facility in the foreign country 
creates option value and encourages the foreign firms to do both FDI and export. Choi 
and Davidson (2003) extends this literature to the oligoplistic market and show that 
the incentive for doing both export and FDI increases due to strategic reasons if the 
firms compete in prices. Contrary to the uncertainty in cost, Rob and Vettas (2003) 
focus on the situation where demand growth in the host-country is uncertain and 
provide the rationale for doing both export and FDI by a foreign monopolist. 
  One common feature of the above-mentioned three papers is that they focus 
on exogenous factors (either cost uncertainty or demand uncertainty) to explain the 
rationale for doing both FDI and export by the foreign firms. In contrast, the present 
paper shows that a foreign firm may prefer to do both FDI and export in a world with 
certainty if, by doing so, it can affect an endogenous variable (here input price) in its 
favor.        
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 considers the 
basic model with a monopolist foreign firm. Section 3 extends the analysis by 
incorporating competition in the final goods market. Section 4 concludes.     
 
2  Monopoly market structure 
Assume that there is a foreign firm, called firm 1, who wants to sell its product in 
another country, called host-country. Firm 1 can sell in the host-country either 
through FDI or export or both.  Assume that firm 1 is the monopolist producer of this 
product. We may think that firm 1 has developed technology for a new product and 
patent protection makes the firm 1 monopoly for this product. Alternatively, we may 
think that high entry cost prevents new firms to enter the product market and makes 
the firm 1 monopolist. For simplicity, we assume that there is no demand for this 
product in the home country of firm 1. 
  Assume that the input market in the home country of firm 1 is perfectly 
competitive, while the input market in the host-country is imperfectly competitive. 
For simplicity, we assume that there is a monopolist input supplier in the host-
country. We further assume that the marginal costs of input production in both home 
and host countries are constant. While we assume it to be   in the home country, it is  c
  3assumed to be zero in the host-country, for simplicity.
3 These assumptions for the 
input markets may fit well if we consider the home country of firm 1 as a developed 
country and the host-country as a developing country. The presence of cheap labor in 
the developing country may be the reason for having lower cost of input production in 
the host-country. Further, while liberalized policy of the home country creates fierce 
competition in the home country input market to make it perfectly competitive, 
restrictive government policy of the developing country may create imperfect 
competition in the host-country input market. 
We assume that the inputs are non-tradable. Therefore, if firm 1 wants to do 
export, it needs to buy inputs from its home country, and, in case of FDI, it needs to 
buy its input from the host-country. We assume that firm 1 needs one unit of input to 
produce one unit of output. Further, for simplicity, we assume that there are no other 
costs associated with either input or final goods production.  
Perfect competition in the home country input market implies that firm 1 is 
able to buy input in the home country at a price c.  But, it has to buy input in the 
host-country at a price charged by the monopolist input supplier. Assume that the 
input supplier in the host-country sells its inputs against a linear price, say  . w
4  
  We consider the following game. In stage 1, firm 1 chooses the amount of 
export it will do.
5 In stage 2, the monopolist input supplier in the host-country sets 
price for its inputs. In stage 3, firm 1 decides its amount of production in the host-
country (i.e., production under FDI). Hence, our analysis allows for export and FDI 
by firm 1. In stage 4, market-clearing price of the final good produced by firm 1 
(through export and/or FDI) is determined and profits are realized.
6 We solve the 
game through backward induction.
7 
                                                           
3 One can do similar analysis by assuming same marginal costs of input production in home and host 
countries, while export from the home country requires a per unit transportation cost  .  c
4 As an alternative specification, one may think the monopolist input supplier of this paper as the 
monopoly union, who sets wage to maximize union rents. For works on rent maximizing union one 
may refer to Booth (1995), Bughin and Vannini (1995), Vannini and Bughin (2000) and Collie and 
Vandenbussche (2003). 
5 Alternatively, one can assume that in stage 1, firm 1 is building its capacity for export by purchasing 
inputs and therefore, the per-unit cost of capacity building is  . Firm 1 cannot change its capacity 
level once installed.  
c
6 It is possible to consider a different timing of the game where the host-country supplier decides on its 
input price before the amount of export decided by firm 1. However, this price is not credible if the 
monopolist input supplier can alter its input price after firm 1’s decision on export. We assume this 
possibility and consider the move of the host-country input supplier after firm 1’s decision on export. 
7 It is trivial to see that if the host-country input market is perfectly competitive, the optimal amount of 
export is zero. 
  4We have considered that firm 1 buys inputs in the home country and decides 
the amount of export before its dealing with the host-country input supplier and 
therefore, before its decision on FDI. This situation may be consistent with the 
previous literature assuming that the foreign firms first set up their plants in the home 
country for exports and then go for FDI (see, e.g., Vernon, 1966, Horstmann and 
Markusen, 1987b, Konishi et al., 1999 and Lin and Saggi, 1999). Later we will briefly 
discuss the implication of a different timing of the game where firm 1 deals with the 
host-country input supplier before its dealing with the home country input supplier.  
  Assume that inverse market demand for the final product in the host-country is
  x q a P − − = ,          ( 1 )   0 > > c a
where x and   are respectively the amount of export and FDI by firm 1.  q
 
2.1  Decision on FDI 
Given the amount of export  , decided by firm 1 and the input price in the host-
country (i.e.,  ), firm 1 maximizes the following expression to determine its output 
to be produced by FDI 
) 0 (≥ x
w
  x c x q a q w x q a Max
q ) ( ) ( − − − + − − − .       ( 2 )  
Maximizing (2) we find that the optimal output produced by firm 1 under FDI is 
 
2
2 * w x a
q
− −
= .          ( 3 )  
It is easy to check that the second order condition for maximization is satisfied. 
  It is clear from (3) that   provided  0
* > q w x a + > 2 , but   for 
. Therefore, if 
0
* = q
w x a + ≤ 2 w x a + ≤ 2 , optimal output of firm 1 is 
2
) c − (a
.   
 
2.2  Optimal input price in the host-country 
Now, we find out optimal input price in the host-country. While choosing optimal 
price of the input, the monopolist input supplier internalizes the production decision 
of firm 1 under FDI. Therefore, demand for input is 
  ,
2
) 2 ( w x a − −
   for  x a w 2 − <       ( 4 )  
  ,    for  w 0 x a 2 − ≥ .       ( 5 )  
  5So, the monopolist input supplier in the host-country maximizes the following 
expressions to determine the price of the input: 
2




, for  x a w 2 − < .
8                              (6) 
Maximizing (6), we find the optimal price of the input 
 
2
) 2 ( * x a
wFDI
−
= .                          (7) 
We define the optimal input prices as   to imply the scenario of positive output of 
firm 1 under FDI. We find that   and   for 
*
FDI w
a 2 − x wFDI
* < 0






2.3  Optimal amount of export 
Firm 1 realizes how the monopolist input supplier in the host-country will behave for 
a given amount of export. Therefore, firm 1 maximizes the following expression 
while choosing its amount of export,  x: 
 
16
) 4 2 3 ( 4 ) 2 )( 2 ( c x a x x a x a
Max
x
− − + − +
.
10                (8) 
Maximizing (8), we find that 
6




11 The second order condition for 
maximization is satisfied. 
While 
2 6
) 4 3 ( * a c a
xFDI <
−
= ,  0
6




xFDI  provided 
3
4c
a > . Since, 
3
4c





c a∈ . But, for 
3
4c
a > , optimal amount of both export and FDI are positive. 
                                                           
8 There is no demand for input if  x a w 2 − > . 
9 Note that input price in the host-country cannot be less than 0 . 
10 The problem (8) is relevant for 
2
a
x ≤ , while the problem faced by firm 1 is  , 
for 
x c x a Max
x ) ( − −
2
a
x > . However, this maximization problem  x c x a Max
x ) ( − −  implies 
2
) ( c a
x
−
= , which 
contradicts the requirement of 
2
a
x > . So, in stage one, the maximization problem faced by firm 1 is 
given by the expression (8).  This implies that the amount of FDI is always positive. 
11 We denote the amount of export by   to imply that for these values of export, firm 1 produces 
positive amount under FDI.  
*
FDI x
  6   Following proposition summarizes the above discussion. 
 
Proposition 1: Assume that the foreign firm is monopolist in the host-country. The 





c a∈ , but it does both export and FDI for 
3
4c
a > . 
 
  So, even if the cost of input production is lower in the host-country but the 
input market is imperfectly competitive there, the foreign firm has the incentive to do 
export when the host-country market size
12 is sufficiently large, i.e., 
3
4c
a > . But the 
foreign firm does FDI irrespective of the market size of the host-country. Therefore, 
the above result shows that we may expect to see foreign firms doing both FDI and if 
the host-country market is sufficiently large and its input market is imperfectly 
competitive.  
It is clear from the above discussion that if the cost of input production in the 
home country is zero then input price in the host-country and the optimal amount of 
production under FDI is zero. But, the qualitative result of the above proposition 
holds for any positive cost of input production in the home country.   
 
2.4  Implications on the host-country input price 
Now, we examine how the input price in the host-country is affected by the output 
decision of firm 1. This will help us to understand the rationale for different entry 
strategies of firm 1. 





c a∈ . Here, firm 1 does ‘FDI only’ and the 
input price in the host-country is 
2
a





c ∈ a . Since, 
the market demand in the host-country is sufficiently low, the optimal total output and 
therefore, the demand for input is sufficiently small. So, even if firm 1 produces the 
entire amount through FDI, it does not create much demand for input in the host-
                                                           
12 Here the intercept term of the demand function is used as a proxy of the market size. 
  7country. This lower demand for input generates lower input price in the host-country 
since the marginal cost of input production is lower in the host-country. 
  Next, consider the values of 
3
4c
a > . Here, firm 1 does both export and FDI 
and the input price in the host-country is 
3
2c
, which is positive and less than  . So, if  c
3
4c
a > , we find that even if the equilibrium input price in the host-country is lower 
compared to the input price in the home country, firm 1 produces positive amount 
under export. The reason for this is the following. If 
3
4c
a >  and firm 1 does ‘FDI 
only’, the input price in the host-country is 
2
a
, which is greater than the input price in 




positive amount of export by firm 1 reduces input price in the host-country and 
increases profit of firm 1.  
Now, we discuss the implication of an alternative move of the game. We have 
assumed in our analysis that firm 1 decides the mount of export before its production 
decision under FDI. Alternatively, firm 1 could deal with the host-country input 
supplier and decide the amount under FDI before it deals with the home country input 
market and decides the amount of export. However, it is easy to understand that, in 
this situation, the input supplier in the host-country has no incentive to reduce its 
input price below  , which will be the input price in the home country. But, as we 
have shown above, firm 1 could reduce the input price in the host-country below  , if 
it decides the amount of export before its production decision under FDI. So, given 
that firm 1 has the choice to decide whether to deal with the host-country input 
supplier before or after its dealing with the home country input market, firm 1 will 
consider the move of the game assumed in our analysis, i.e., it will first decide the 




2.5  Implication of the fixed costs of FDI 
To show the strategic effects of export and FDI through host-country input markets 
we have abstracted our analysis from other aspects of FDI such as the fixed costs of 
  8doing FDI. The implication of the fixed costs of FDI on our result is very easy to 
understand. Sufficient amount of fixed cost of FDI requires the product market to be 
sufficiently large for having FDI. We have seen that firm 1 does ‘FDI only’ when the 
host-country market is sufficiently large. This results hold if the fixed cost of doing 
FDI is not sufficiently high. But, for significant amount of fixed costs of FDI, it will 
reduce firm 1’s incentive for FDI and will encourage it to do export. In this situation, 
firm 1 does ‘export only’ for very small market size, does ‘FDI only’ for moderate 
market size and does both export and FDI for relatively large market size. 
The above observation makes the following proposition immediately.  
 
Proposition 2: (a) If fixed costs of FDI never prevent firm 1 to do FDI, Proposition 1 
holds. 
(b) If fixed costs of FDI prevent firm 1 to do FDI for very small amounts of market 
size, it does ‘export only’ for very small market size, does ‘FDI only’ for moderate 
market size and does both export and FDI for relatively large market size.    
 
3  Duopoly market structure 
In the previous section we have seen that imperfectly competitive host-country input 
market may provide the rationale for doing both FDI and export by the same foreign 
firm. Now, we examine the implications of competition in the final goods market on 
our result. 
To consider the implications of competition in the final goods market, we 
assume that there is a potential entrant in the host-country firm, called firm 2, who 
can produce a homogeneous product and compete with firm 1 like Cournot 
duopolists. As before, firm 1 can do either FDI or export or both.  
  The specifications for the input markets are similar to the previous section. 
Further, we assume that both firms need one unit of input to produce one unit of 
output. Since, our purpose is to focus on the role of competition in the final goods 
market, we abstract our analysis from any other costs faced by the entrant, i.e., firm 2.   
  We consider the following game. In stage 1, firm 1 chooses the amount of 
export it will do. In stage 2, the monopolist input supplier in the host-country sets the 
  9price for its inputs. In stage 3, firm 2 decides whether to enter or not.
13 In stage 4, firm 
1 and firm 2 simultaneously decide their amount of production in the host-country. In 
stage 5, market-clearing price of the final goods is determined and profits are realized. 
We solve the game through backward induction. 
 
3.1  Decision on FDI 
Given the amount of export   and the input price in the host-country (i.e.,  ), 
firm 1 maximizes the following expression to determine its output under FDI: 
) 0 (≥ x w
  x c x q q a q w x q q a Max
q q ) ( ) ( 2 1 1 2 1 − − − − + − − − − .     (9) 





w q x a
q
− − −
= .                       (10) 
It is easy to check that the second order condition for maximization is satisfied. 
  Given the amount of export of firm 1 and the input price in the host-country, 
firm 2 maximizes the following expression to determine its optimal production: 
  2 2 1 ) (
2
q w x q q a Max
q
− − − − .                      (11) 





w q x a
q
− − −
= .                        (12)  
It is easy to check that second order condition for maximization is satisfied. 
  Solving (10) and (12), we get the optimal outputs of firm 1 under FDI and the 
optimal outputs of firm 2 are respectively  
 
3












= .                 (13) 
It is clear from (13) that   provided  0
*
1 > q w x a + > 3 , but   for  . 
Therefore, optimal output of firm 2 is 
0
*
1 = q w x a + ≤ 3
2
( x a ) w − −





                                                           
13 Since there is no technological difference between the firms and firm 2 has no other costs except the 
  10 
3.2  Optimal input price in the host-country 
While choosing the optimal input price, the monopolist input supplier in the host-
country internalizes the production decisions of the firms as given in (13). Therefore, 
the demand for inputs in the host-country is 
  ,
3
) 2 3 2 ( w x a − −
 for  w x a 3 − <                   (14) 
  ,
2
) ( w x a − −
   for  x a w 3 − ≥                   (15) 
  ,    for  0 x a w − ≥ .                  (16) 
The host-country input supplier maximizes the following expressions to determine its 
input price, given the amount of export decided by firm 1: 
3




, for  w x a 3 − <                 (17) 
2




,   for  x a w 3 − ≥ .
14                (18) 
Maximizing (17) and (18), we get the optimal prices of the inputs are respectively 
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) 3 2 ( * x a
wFDI
−







= .                 (20) 
We define the optimal input prices as   and   to imply the scenario of positive 
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( x∈ , the input price in the host-
country depends on the relative profitability of the input supplier for   and  . 

















                                                                                                                                                                      
costs of input, it is trivial that firm 2 will always enter the market in equilibrium.  
14 Because there is no demand for input if  x a w − > . 
  11provided  0 ) (
6
2
2 < > + −
a
ax x . We get that  0
6
2
2 = + −
a
ax x  for 
3 2
) 1 3 ( −
=
a








  We summarize the above discussion in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3: (a) If 
3 2
) 1 3 ( −
<
a
x , the optimal input price in the host-country is 
4
) 3 2 ( * x a
wFDI
−
= . But, for 
3 2
) 1 3 ( −
<
a








= .    
(b) Firm 1 does FDI if 
3 2
) 1 3 ( −
<
a
x  but there is no FDI for 
3 2





3.3  Optimal amount of export 
If firm 1 chooses 
3 2
) 1 3 ( −
<
a
x , it realizes that input price in the host-country is 
4
) 3 2 ( * x a
wFDI
−







=  for 
3 2
) 1 3 ( −
>
a
x . Therefore, firm 1 maximizes the following expressions while 
choosing the amount of export, x: 
 
144
) 12 6 8 ( 12 ) 9 2 )( 3 2 ( c x a x x a x a
Max
x
− − + − +
,   for   
3 2
) 1 3 ( −
<
a
x            (21) 
and  
    
6





,          for   
3 2
) 1 3 ( −
>
a
x .           (22) 
Maximizing (21) without any restriction on  x, we get 
33





second order condition for maximization is satisfied. 
                                                           
15 We denote the amount of export by   to imply that for these values of export, firm 1 produces 
positive amount under FDI.  
*
FDI x
  12 
33
) 24 14 ( * c a
xFDI
−
=  is positive provided 
7
12c
a >  and is less than 
3 2
) 1 3 ( − a
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c a∈  firm 
1’s optimal export is zero and does under ‘FDI only’ but its production under export 
and FDI are positive for  )









a .      
  Next, consider the unrestricted optimization problem of (22). Maximizing (22) 
without any restriction on  x, the optimal amount of export is 
14













=  is greater than 
3 2
) 1 3 ( − a
 provided 





a . Therefore, 
solution of (22) implies that if 





a  then firm 1 does ‘export only’. We 
find that 
) 3 5 33
3 48















c a∈  then we have a unique production decision of firm 1, 
i.e., here firm 1 produces under ‘FDI only’. If  )









a , we have a 
unique production decision of firm 1 where firm 1 produces positive amounts under 
both export and FDI. If 





a , then also we have a unique production 
decision of firm 1 where firm 1 does ‘export only’. But we have two possibilities for 
)
) 3 5 33 (
3 48
,






a . Here firm 1 can produce either ‘
33




and also positive amount under FDI’ or ‘
14





=  and nothing under FDI’. 
Whether firm 1 prefers the former strategy or the latter depends on the relative 
profitability of these strategies. 
                                                           
16 We denote the amount of export by   to imply that for these values of export, firm 1 does not 




  13 Assume  that  )
) 3 5 33 (
3 48
,




( ∈ a . If firm 1 produces 
33
) 24 14 ( * c a
xFDI
−
=  and also positive amount under FDI, its profit is 
 
1089
) 24 14 )( 21 15 ( ) 5 18 )( 6 9 ( ,
1
c a c a a c c a FDI EX − − + − −
= π .              (23) 
But if firm does export only, i.e., 
14





= , its profit is 
 
784
) 6 5 )( 38 27 ( 0 ,
1
c a c a EX − −
= π .                              (24) 
It is easy to check that (24) is greater than (23) over  )
) 3 5 33 (
3 48
,








Hence, firm 1 does only export if  )
) 3 5 33 (
3 48
,







18   
  The following proposition summarizes the above discussion. 
 





c ∈ a . 
(b) Firm 1 does both export and FDI for  )










(c) Firm 1 does ‘export only’ for 







3.4  Implications on the host-country input price  
Now we examine the effects of different production strategy of firm 1 on the host-
country input price. 
                                                           
17 We find after straightforward calculation that (24) is greater than (23) provided 
. The right hand side of this inequality is increasing in   and 
positive at 
2 2 62172 21120 17665 0 c ac a − − < a





a .  So, (24) is greater than (23) over  )
) 3 5 33 (
3 48
,






a .   





c ∈ a . Here, firm 1 does FDI only and the input price in 
the host-country will be 
2
a





c a∈ . If firm 1 does 
export, it can reduce the input price in the host-country but needs to incur higher cost 
of production for export. When the market size is very small, the benefit from export 
is not sufficiently large since the input price in the host-country is already sufficiently 
low and therefore, here firm 1 does FDI only. 
 Next,  consider  )







( ∈ a . Here, firm 1 does both export and FDI 
and the input price in the host-country is 
11
) 6 2 ( c a +
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a∈ , the input price 
in the host-country is lower than the input price in the home country of firm 1, while 
the input price in the host-country is higher than the input price in the home country 
when  )









a .  
By doing both export and FDI, firm 1 can keep the input price in the host-








a∈ . This benefit 









Now, consider for  )









a . Here, input price in the host-country 
is higher than the input price in the home country. Anticipating this possibility, firm 1 
could produce the amount of export in a way (i.e.,  ε +
−
3 2
) 1 3 ( a
, where  0 → ε ) so 
that it could commit that it would not produce under FDI. But, this strategy reduces 
                                                                                                                                                                      
18 There is a possibility that firm 1 wants to produce ‘  and the corresponding amount 
under FDI’ than doing ‘export only’ and producing   when  . It is 
3 2

















  15the total market share of firm 1 and eliminates firm 1’s incentive for producing this 
amount of ‘export only’.
19 Since, the analysis assumed that firm 1 cannot readjust the 
amount of export once chosen, it can either do FDI or nothing after its decision on 
export. Since, the host country input price 
11
) 6 2 ( c a +
 makes it profitable for firm 1 to 
produce under FDI when  )









a , it does both export and FDI for these 
market sizes. Further, it is easy to understand that ‘FDI only’ would cause the host-
country price to be higher than 
11
) 6 2 ( c a +
 and makes this strategy unprofitable to firm 
1 compared to both export and FDI. So, firm 1’s optimal strategy is to produce both 















  Lastly consider the situation where 





a . Here, firm 1 does ‘export 
only’ and the input price in the host-country is 
28
) 6 9 ( c a +
, which is greater than c for 





a . As market size increases, it increases the input price in the hoist-
country. Since, here market size is sufficiently large, it increases the price of input 
significantly and reduces firm 1’s benefit from FDI. As a result, here firm 1 is better 
off by doing export only. 
 
3.5  Implication of the fixed costs of FDI 
The implication for the existence of fixed costs of FDI is similar to section 2.5. 
Proposition 4 holds if fixed costs of FDI never prevent firm 1 to do FDI. But, if the 
fixed costs of FDI prevent firm 1 to do FDI for very small host-country market size, 
we will observe ‘export only’ for both very small and very large host-country 
markets. Firm 1 does ‘FDI only’ for moderate but relatively small market size and 
both export and FDI for moderate but relatively large market size.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
clear from the above discussion that this strategy is not optimal for firm 1.    
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3.6  Effect of competition on the production decision of firm 1 
Now we are in a position to compare the effects of host-country competition on 
export and FDI. 
 
Proposition 5: (a) ‘Only export’ by firm 1 may be the outcome when firm 1 faces 
competition from firm 2 but not when firm 1 is monopoly. 
(b) Incentive for ‘only FDI by firm 1’ is higher when firm 1 faces competition from 
firm 2 compared to the situation when firm 1 is monopoly. 
(c) Incentive for ‘both export and FDI by firm 1’ is lower when firm 1 faces 
competition from firm 2 compared to the situation when firm 1 is monopoly. 
 
Proof: (a) It directly follows from Propositions 1 and 4. 
(b) From Proposition 1 we find that firm 1 does FDI only provided 
3
4c
a <  when it is 
monopoly in the host-country. But, if firm faces competition in the host-country, it 
does ‘FDI only’ when 
7
12c







, it proves the result. 
(c) Proposition 1 shows that firm 1 does both export and FDI provided 
3
4c
a >  when 
it is monopoly in the host-country. But firm 1 does both export and FDI when 





a  and if it faces competition in the host-country. Since, 







, it proves the result.                Q.E.D. 
 
  Reasons for the above results are as follows. If there is competition in the 
host-country and the market size is sufficiently small, firm 1’s loss of profit is higher 
under export compared to FDI since its marginal cost of production is higher under 
export compared to FDI. As a result, if the host-country market is sufficiently small, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
*
1
* q xFDI +
19 Straightforward calculation shows that firm 1’ market share under ‘export and FDI’ (i.e., 
) is  , which is greater than  .  ε +
−
3 2
) 1 3 ( a
11
) 2 3 ( c a−
  17competition in the host-country increases firm 1’s incentive for FDI compared to 
export. 
But, if the host-country market is sufficiently large, it increases the price of 
input significantly and reduces the incentive for FDI. Without competition in the host-
country and becoming a monopolist producer, firm 1 could manipulate the amount of 
export and FDI in a way so that it could neutralize the effect of higher market size on 
the host-country input price. But, the presence of firm 2 reduces its power to 
manipulate the host-country input price through the choice of export. Hence, while 
‘export only’ is not optimal without competition in the host-country, it is optimal in 
presence of competition in the host-country when the host-country market is 
sufficiently large.   
So, while the presence of competition increases the incentive for ‘FDI only’ 
and ‘export only’, it reduces the incentive for both export and FDI.  
 
4 Conclusion 
Empirical findings have shown that export and FDI may act either as substitutes or 
complements. While the previous literature has mainly explained the rationale for 
substitutability between export and FDI, they have paid little attention to explain that 
export and FDI may be complements. Recent theoretical literature has paid attention 
to the exogenous factors such as cost and demand uncertainty to explain 
complementarity between export and FDI  
The present paper focuses on the endogenous factors to explain that export 
and FDI may be complements. We show that if the host-country input market is 
imperfectly competitive and production requires non-tradable inputs, foreign firms 
may prefer to both export and FDI. Export by foreign firms helps to affect the input 
price in the host-country and increases foreign firm’s profit from FDI. This strategic 
reason provides the foreign the incentive to do export even if it needs to face 
relatively higher input price in the home country.  
We further show that foreign firm has the incentive to do both export and FDI 
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